The New Fourth Branch Institutions fro Protecting Constitutions Democracy at Meripustak

The New Fourth Branch Institutions fro Protecting Constitutions Democracy

Books from same Author: Mark Tushnet

Books from same Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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  • General Information  
    Author(s)Mark Tushnet
    PublisherCambridge University Press
    ISBN9781316517833
    Pages220
    BindingHardcover
    LanguageEnglish
    Publish YearDecember 2021

    Description

    Cambridge University Press The New Fourth Branch Institutions fro Protecting Constitutions Democracy by Mark Tushnet

    Twenty-first-century constitutions now typically include a new 'fourth branch' of government, a group of institutions charged with protecting constitutional democracy, including electoral management bodies, anticorruption agencies, and ombuds offices. This book offers the first general theory of the fourth branch; in a world where governance is exercised through political parties, we cannot be confident that the traditional three branches are enough to preserve constitutional democracy. The fourth branch institutions can, by concentrating within themselves distinctive forms of expertise, deploy that expertise more effectively than the traditional branches are capable of doing. However, several case studies of anticorruption efforts, electoral management bodies, and audit bureaus show that the fourth branch institutions do not always succeed in protecting constitutional democracy, and indeed sometimes undermine it. The book concludes with some cautionary notes about placing too much hope in these – or, indeed, in any – institutions as the guarantors of constitutional democracy.